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Conciliation of Laws in the NAFTA Countries
H. Patrick Glenn*
Symeon Symeonides has brought to his work on the codification and reporting
of private international law a vast knowledge of the efforts of many states, and of
many authors, in bringing about international legal harmony. His work on the
codification of Louisiana conflicts rules reflects this background, in its insistence
that interest analysis be conducted in an even-handed manner through the process
of comparative impairment.' This essay is also an effort towards international legal
equilibrium, and it is a pleasure to dedicate it to Professor Symeonides and to his
ongoing work. Its thesis is that the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) 2 should require us to think of North American private law in terms of
conflict avoidance rather than in terms of conflict. How can we help to bring about
a conciliation of the private laws of the NAFTA countries?
I. NAFTA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
NAFTA came into force on January 1, 1994 and immediately brought about
comparison with the integrating mechanisms of the European Union.' As a free
trade arrangement, NAFTA removes tariff and non-tarriffbarriers to trade in goods
between the member countries, without creating a common, external tariff wall.
The European Union, as an integrating customs union, creates such a common,
external tariff wall and, as well, creates a complex set of institutions to insure
uniformity or harmony of national European laws. These include the European
Council and Commission (having extensive legislative authority through enactment
of pan-European, private law Directives) and the European Court of Justice,
charged with overseeing the application of the basic norms of the Union. The next
stage of European legal integration would be the creation of a European "judicial
space," in which the judgments of the courts ofeach countrywouldbe automatically
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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University.
1. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Private International Law Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction:
The Louisiana Experience, 57 RabelsZ 460 (1993); Symeon C. Symeonides, Les grandsprobl6mes de
droll international priv6 et la nouvelle codification deLouisiane, 81 Rev. critique de droit international
privd 223 (1992); Symeon C. Symeonides, Problems and Dilemmas in Codifying Choice ofLawfor
Torts: The Louisiana Experience in Comparative Perspective,38 Am. J. Comp. L. 431 (1990). See
also La. Civ. Code art. 3515 which provides: "Except as otherwise'provided in this Book, an issue in
a case having contacts with other states is governed by the law of the state whose policies would be
most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue."
2. See the North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (ch's. 1-9),605 (ch's. 10-22),
(1993).
3. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of
the ECModel and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 917 (1992); Frederick M.
Abbott, The North American Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the European Union, 4
Transnat'l L & Contemp. Probs. 119 (1994).
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recognized and executable in the other countries.' In contrast, it has been said that
NAFTA is characterized by an "institutional meagerness," which eventually leaves
the playing field to the discretion of the national legal institutions and processes of
each of the Member States.5
To what extent, however, does a common market require a common law? It
may depend on the common market. The European market is composed of
sovereign, unitary states in which judicial review at the national level has been the
exception rather than the rule. There has often been no internal recourse against
legislative over-reach. The law of the European continental States, those of the
original Common Market, is also in principle codified law, such that differences in
national codification can be easily seen as conflicts of laws. The conflicts are
clearly visible in the opposition of bright line, codified rules. Conflict is less
apparent, however, in the casuistic case law of common lawjurisdictions. Thus, the
European common market is one in which a need for pan-European institutions
could be seen as evident, given the absence of any other means of reconciling
national legislative wills.
The North American situation is different. All three states are federal or
confederal,6 in character, such that in each state there are judicial institutions which
have long arbitrated between competing jurisdictions. The territorial reach of the
legislation of the states and provinces of North America is thus, necessarily, limited
by the national constitutions. Much of North America also adheres to the common
law tradition and this inevitably reduces conflicts of laws, either through the
commonality of shared rules or through the submerging of conflicts in the mass of
decisional law. All three North American jurisdictions, moreover, constitute
internal common markets which have functioned with a diversity of internal laws.
4. See L "espace judiciaire european va voir progressivement le jour, Le Monde, selection
hebdomadaire (Paris), Oct. 23, 1999, at 4. This measure would essentially eliminate the significance
of national boundaries for the recognition of judgments, a step beyond "Full Faith and Credit" as it is
known in the national laws of North America. There is no pan-North-American equivalent, however,
to either "Full Faith and Credit" or a transnational judicial space.
5. Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the NAFTA and the EU
Disciplines, 21 B. C. Int'l. & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1998). NAFTA does provide for dispute resolution
techniques arising under the Agreement itself, notably in relation to disputes over anti-dumping or
countervailing duty measures, investment, and general interpretation of the Agreement. See also James
R. Cannon, Jr., Resolving Disputes Under NAFTA Chapter 19 (Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 1994); J.C.
Thomas & Sergio L6pez Ayll6n, NAFTA Dispute Settlement and Mexico: Interpreting Treaties and
Reconciling Common and Civil Law Systems in a Free Trade Area, Can. Y.B. Int'l. L. 75 (1995);
Michael S.Valihora, NAFTA Chapter 19 or the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body: A Hobson's Choice
for Canada?, 30 Case W. Res. J. Int'l. L. 447 (1998); David Lopez, Dispute Resolution UnderNAFTA:
Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 Tex. Int'l. L.J. 163 (1997).
6. The United States of America and Mexico are both federations; Canada at its inception was
considered a Confederation and is still often designated as one. In recent years, the language of
federation has, however, become more frequent in Canada. For the consequences of the original
Confederal model on the Canadian court structure, see H. Patrick Glenn, Divided Justice? Judicial
Structures in Federal and Confederal States, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 819 (1995); and for the relations between
U.S. state and Canadian provincial structures, see H. Patrick Glenn, Reconciling Regimes: Legal
Relations of States and Provinces in North America, 15 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 255 (1998).
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The "institutional meagerness" of NAFTA may therefore be seen as an indication
of continuing faith in the adaptability of federal structures and in informal processes
of harmonization, and not simply as hostility or indifference to NAFTA objectives.
The range of conflicts in North America will be exacerbated, however, by the
operation of NAFTA. Under NAFTA, there is an increase in trans-border activity,
which will have the effect of raising conflicts which have thus far remained latent.
The weight of the civil law has also been increased in North America, since now
Mexico, Louisiana and Quebec find themselves important participating units in a
larger structure, as opposed to separate or isolated civil law jurisdictions. NAFTA
also presents a challenge in bringing together three different economies, those ofthe
world's largest economic power (the United States of America), a developing
country (Mexico) and a middle power in transition from a resource-based economy
to a technology-based economy (Canada). There is, therefore, ample room for
private law conflicts, if we think in terms of conflicts, and no NAFTA institutions
for their resolution. In these circumstances, what are the means of conflict
avoidance? They can be found at the level of legal structures and at the level of
legal techniques. Taken together, they may provide an efficient process of
continental conflict avoidance.
II. STRUCTURES OF CONFLICT AVOIDANCE
Since the nationalization of western law in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, western lawyers have been trained to think in terms of conflict of laws
rather than in terms of their conciliation. Hence, we have an entire discipline of
conflicts of laws, which accepts the existence of conflict as a given, and resolves
each conflict by declaring a winner. There has been great debate, and rightly so, as
to how this process can best be justified. Professor Batiffol thus traced the
philosophical foundations of private international law, or conflicts of laws, to the
allegedly systemic character of national laws, and conflict is necessarily found in
the competing, national claims to exclusivity.7
This nineteenth century attitude towards sources of law, however, is changing.
There appear to be two primary reasons for this. One is found in the process of
regionalization, two examples of which are now provided by Europe and North
America. The European process of regionalization has resulted in the creation of
pan-European law, such that conflicts are necessarily reduced through the creation
of pan-national sources of law. There has been less of this in North America, but
the process of regionalization in North America has shifted the emphasis of legal
thought, in some measure at least, away from national sovereignty towards
efficiency, harmony and prosperity in regional trade.
The second reason for a shift away from nineteenth century ideas is the large
process of informal harmonization of laws which has been taking place in the world.
There are many features of this. Most significantly, for North American purposes,
is the increasingly visible commensurability between civil and common law
7. Henri Batiffol, Aspects philosophiques du droit international priv6 16, 24 (1956).
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traditions.' In the nineteenth century, in France, the Soci&t6 de lgislation
comparge was created because it was not thought possible to compare the codified
law of Europe with the'case law of the common law world. Realistic comparison
was possible only between comparable sources of law and, given the civilian
tradition, only legislation provided these comparable sources. Today,jurisprudence
or case law has grown in importance in civil law jurisdictions while common law
jurisdictions are filled with legislation. In structural terms, the common law has
abandoned what was for centuries its most characteristic institution, the writ system,
and now expresses itself in terms of substantive law (whether legislative or
jurisprudential in origin) which can be applied by a judge.9 There are no longer
major differences in sources of law; there are only more minor differences in the
specific content of rules.
Regionalization and harmonization have been accompanied, moreover, by
corresponding changes in professional structures and legal education. The trans-
border law firm is a new phenomenon in legal history and places legal practitioners,
in a sense, above national sources of law.'0 The intellectual resources of these firms
are rooted in the laws of many jurisdictions, allowing assessment and comparison
of national laws within a single professional unit. Formal or superficial differences
in law may thus be identified as such, given deeper knowledge of the entire
normative base of each jurisdiction and its actual application. In the context of
NAFTA, these larger professional structures are now accompanied by an increased
measure of individual mobility, given NAFTA's endorsement of the concept of the
Foreign Legal Consultant, authorized to practice the law of their home jurisdiction
in another, host jurisdiction." Legal education is less ambulatory or comparative
in North America than in Europe, where the ERASMUS program has led to great
mobility of law students, in formal programs of exchange over national borders. In
North America there is now, however, a North American Consortium for Legal
Education; 2 a program of student mobility funded by the NAFTA governments for
8. This extends to private international law itself. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny s Triumph?
Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 Va. J. Int'l. L. 571, 572
(1999) ("quiet harmonisation," "it just happens"); and for international convergence beyond western
jurisdictions, See K. Pistor & P. A. Weloons, The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic
Development 1960-95 at 1, 7 (1999) (overall convergence of six Asian economies, and with West,
notably in reduction of the role of State, greater emphasis on "rule-based procedures").
9. H. Patrick Glenn, La civilisation de la common law, Rev. int'l. droit comp. 559 (1993).
10. See generally H. Patrick Glenn, Private International Law and the New International Legal
Professions, in Conflicts and Harmonization[:] Mdlanges en l'honneur d'Alfred von Overbeck at 31
(1990); Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualification and Educational Requirementsfor Law Practice
in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 443 (1989).
11. Annex 1210.5 (Professional Services, Section B -Foreign Legal Consultants), NAFTA,supra
note 2; and see Sydney M. Cone, Il, International Trade in Legal Services[:] Regulation of Lawyers
and Firms in Global Practice, ch. 2 (1999); H. Patrick Glenn, The Regulation of Transboundary Legal
Practice, in Contemporary Law 1998 Droit contemporain[:] Canadian Reports to the 1998 International
Congress of Comparative Law, Bristol, 1998, 247 (1999); Julie Barker, The North American Free
Trade Agreement and the Complete Integration of the Legal Profession: Dismantling the Barriers to
Providing Cross-Border Legal Services, 19 Hous. J. Int'l. L. 95 (1996).
12. The Consortium, created at the initiative of Dean Stephen Zamora of the Houston Law
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which law students are eligible; 3 as well as a wider phenomenon of "Global Law
Schools."' 4
The structures within which lawyers work and are trained will, therefore, be
more open and fluid in the next century than in the immediately preceding ones.
The systemic and exclusive character of national law will be less evident. It will be
more possible to overlook and avoid conflicts whose resolution is not necessary for
efficient resolution of a case. Whether this will be done, however, is dependent on
more precise legal techniques, notably those of the pleading and proof of foreign
law.
III. TECHNIQUES OF CONFLICT AVOIDANCE: PLEADING AND PROOF
OF FOREIGN LAW
Private international law became very important in the nineteenth century,
when law came to be thought of, in many jurisdictions, exclusively as state
law. International cases did not obviously belong to a given state, yet the
fundamental equality of all states meant that a neutral method had to be
found to allocate international cases to a single national law. This basic
philosophy favored the development of bilateral choice-of-law rules, whose
function was the allocation of cases according to neutral connecting factors,
and which constituted the principal choice-of-law technique for most of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe and in North America. If this
view is taken to its logical conclusion, which has inevitably occurred, it
follows that private international law must intervene in every international
case, Which must necessarily be allocated to a national law before
examination of the merits may begin. Different language and arguments are
used to justify this conclusion: the judge must apply choice of law rules
d'office, or von Amts wegen; foreign law must be respected as law, not fact;
straightforward application of the law of the forum in an international case
represents unacceptable bias against foreign law. These are praiseworthy
sentiments, and have resulted in a number of civil law jurisdictions, including
Switzerland and Germany, accepting the principle that private international
Center, is composed of law schools of nine North American Universities: Houston, the University of
Arizona and George Washington in the U.S.A.; McGill, Dalhousie and Ottawa in Canada; and the
Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Panamericana and the Instituto Tecnologico de Monterrey in
Mexico. See North American Consortium on Legal Education (visited Aug. 17, 2000) <http://www.
law.uh.edu/nacle>.
13. In the United States, see The Fund For Improvement of Post Secondary Education (visited
Aug. 17, 2000) <http://www.ed.gov/offices/OPE/ FIPSE/NAFTA/inst.htm>.
14. See David S. Clark, Transnational Legal Practice: The Need for Global Law Schools, 46
Am. J. Comp. L 261 (Supp. 1998); and on further North American initiatives in particular law schools,
see Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects of
Free Trade, 12 Ariz. J. Int'l. & Comp. L. 401,420-23 (1995).
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law rules must be obligatorily applied by the judge in all cases. 5 Jurisdictions
accepting this principle have also developed sophisticated techniques for
ascertaining the content of foreign law, notably resort by judges to opinion-writing
by researchers of national or university foreign law institutes.
Such insistence on the equal character of national laws results, however, in a
presumption of conflict of laws. Allocation must precede any determination of
whether the national laws in presence are even different. Allocation is undertaken
because it is presumed in private law matters that states are interested in the
application of their law to international cases, regardless of the law in question and
regardless of whether it actually differs from any other law in presence. So an
expensive and time-consuming second-order process of choice of law must take
place in all international cases. This is the logic of nineteenth century thinking
which concentrates on notions of national sovereignty. It is not the logic of
regionalization or free trade areas, it is suggested, in which an emphasis is placed
on reducing the importance of national boundaries and other impediments to cross-
border circulation of goods and products. In the context ofregionalization and free
trade, conflicts of laws must be dealt with, but it is contrary to the objectives of free
trade to presume that conflict exists in all cases. This is particularly the case when
structures exist, as presently in North America, which both limit the reach of
national laws and allow assessment, notably in trans-border law firms, of the extent
of actual conflict. What further justification can be offered for refusing, in an
obligatory manner, to allocate cases to a single national law in all instances?
The traditional common law response to this question is to treat foreign law as
fact, which does not exist unless it is pleaded and proved. " From the perspective
of private international law, this position may be seen as an historical accident,
since it flowed from a time in which English courts in principle applied only the lex
fori and entrusted its application to the jury, such that any deviation from this
process had to result from a different plea and different proof.7 In the result,
however, the common law was able to avoid a presumption of conflict of laws. It
allowed parties to implicitly agree on application of the law of the forum, through
failing to plead and prove foreign law whenever they saw no significant difference
15. For Swiss law see art. 16 of the Federal Law on Private International Law of Dec. 18, 1987
("The contents of the foreign law shall be established by the authority on its own motion"); and for
general acceptance of the principle in Germany, see Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht 504
(1990). For further references see the comparative colloquium of the Institut de droit cornpar6,
Universiti de Strasbourg, Les problimes actuels posis par l'application des lois etrangdres, 23
Annales de la Facultd de droit de Strasbourg (1998).
16. In English law, see Fremoult v. Dedire, I P. Wins 429,24 Eng. Rep. 458 (1718); Mostyn v.
Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1774), and for reception into U.S. law by Chief Justice
Marshall see Church v. Hubbart 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 236 (1804); Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay,
Conflict of Laws 418 (2d ed. 1992).
17. On the historical development of choice of law in England, see Alexander N. Sack, Conflicts
of Laws in the History of the English Law, in 3 Law: A Century of Progess 342 (1937); and on the
relation of this historical development to pleading and proof of foreign law, See H. Patrick Glenn,




between the national laws in presence. This conclusion continued to be based on
historical reasons, however, and these reasons did not address nineteenth century
concerns about equal treatment of states. They also resulted in procedural
anomalies, such as the determination of foreign law being left to the jury and being
the object only of limited appellate review. "SHow have these traditional civil and
common law positions been received in North American jurisdictions?
U.S. law appears faithful to the original common law model, while having
removed some of the procedural anomalies. Foreign law is widely described as
fact, required to be pleaded and proved by the parties, though its determination is
now described by Federal Rule 44.1 "as a ruling on a question of law."' 9 This
extends appellate review and removes the determination of foreign law from the
jury. The U.S. common law position has, however, been vigorously criticized on
grounds similar to those raised in civil law jurisdictions. Judge Roger Miner thus
argued in 1995 that "[i]t is strange indeed for a court to consciously apply the
wrong law, based on the position taken by the parties, while acknowledging a
discretionary authority to apply the right law."2 Judge Miner would apparently
impose a duty on the court not only to determine the content of foreign law pleaded
but not proven by the parties, but also to insist on application of foreign law. This
duty would arise "as soon as it becomes apparent to the court that foreign law
governs" and notice by a party would not be essential "to bring the issue into the
case."21 Judge Miner's position is an eloquent plea for the reception of foreign law
in U.S. federal courts but, with respect, the price paid for such reception is
unacceptably high. Foreign law can be received into federal courts in all cases
where it is necessary to do so, i.e., where a genuine conflict exists which has been
identified and insisted upon by one of the parties. In other cases, within the
NAFTA area, insistence on a presumption of conflict, accompanied by obligatory
determination and application of foreign law, is neither required norjustified. U.S.
case law appears to continue to support this view.22 There would, therefore, be no
interest on the part of states in having their law applied to an international private
law case, where such law is not invoked by one of the parties. This is most evident
where the law in question is suppletive in character, as for most of the law of
contracts, for example. It would also be the case, however, for private law rules
which in a domestic cadre are considered imperative.
The U.S. position is replicated in Canadian common law provinces, which have
always adhered to the classic English position. Given the virtual absence ofjuries
in Canadian private law practice, the Canadian position also parallels the reformed
18. Scoles & Hay, supra, note 16, at 418-19.
19. 28 U.S.C. Rule 44.1 (1992); and see Scoles & Hay, supra, note 16, at 418 (indicating that
judicial notice of foreign law is now permitted in some states); Lawrence W. Newman & David
Zaslowsky, Litigating International Commercial Disputes 153-55 (1996) (indicating court may
undertake its own investigation of the content of foreign law, once it is pleaded).
20. Roger J. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal Courts, 43 Am. J. Comp.
L. 581, 583 (1995).
21. Id. at 584.
22. Miner, supra note 20.
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U.S. law in terms of determination of foreign law by the judge and the extent of
appellate review.23
The civil law jurisdictions in North America are those which are most
sympathetic, in structural terms, to the treatment of foreign law as law and not fact.
These jurisdictions have not been through the common law history of having to
displace the jury's use of local law by pleading and proof of foreign law.
Historically, however, the civil law jurisdictions of North America have not
followed the model of those continental jurisdictions which have insisted on
obligatory application of private international law rules. The clearest example of
this appears to be Louisiana, which has never deviated from practice elsewhere in
North America and whose present codification of conflicts of laws contains no
provision which would oblige ajudge, on the judge's own initiative, to apply choice
of law rules not invoked by the parties.24
Quebec has also declined the obligatory character of private international law
rules, following in this both the common law and the historic French position on the
question.' Quebec's new Civil Code, which came into force on January 1, 1994,
codifies both the law of proof and private international law. During the preparation
of the new Quebec Civil Code, however, the French Court of Cassation in a series
of decisions gave some support to the obligatory character of private international
law rules, though eventually refusingto take such a categorical position.26 Whether
these developments have influenced Quebec law can best be seen in reproducing the
relevant articles of the new Quebec Civil Code:
2807. Judicial notice shall be taken of the law in force in Quebec.
2809. Judicial notice may be taken of the law of other provinces or
territories of Canada and that of a foreign state, provided it has been
pleaded. The court may also require that proof be made of such law; this
may be done, among other means, by expert testimony or by the
production of a certificate drawn up by a jurisconsult.
Where such law has not been pleaded or its content cannot be
established, the court applies the law in force in Quebec.
23. See generally J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws 147 (3d ed. 1994).
24. For discussion of the general provisions on judicial notice of the Louisiana Evidence Code,
which also do not deviate from the historical North American position, see Frank L. Maraist, Evidence
and Proof, 19 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise Series 45-48 (1999).
25. The French position was crystallized in the Bisbal decision of the French Court of Cassation;
Cass. le. civ., May 12, 1959, D. Jur. 1960, 610, note Philippe Malaurie; J.C.P. 1960, II, 11733, note
Henri Motuisky, which allowed Italian nationals to divorce in France by invoking French law at a time
when divorce was prohibited in Italian law.
26. See, for deviation from the Bisbal jurisprudence, Cass. Oct. 11, 1988 and Oct. 18, 1988,
Clunet 1989, 349, note D. Alexandre; cf. Cass. Dec. 4, 1990, Clunet 1991, 371, note Dominique
Bureau; Cass. Nov. 5, 1991 and Dec. 10, 1991, 81 Revue Critique de Droit International Privd
1992.314, note Horatia Muir Watt; and for the ongoing debate Jan. 27, 1998, J.C.P. 1998,11, 10098;
May 26, 1999, J.C.P. 1999,11, 10192.
[Vol. 601110
H. PATRICK GLENN1
Article 2807 may be read as consistent with the obligatory character of private
international law rules, of which judicial notice shall (not may) be taken. However,
article 2809 clearly indicates that application of foreign law is subject to the
condition of its having been pleaded; absent pleading of foreign law, the law of the
forum is applied. Article 2807 thus obviates pleading and proof by the parties of
Quebec rules of private international law. These rules are not, however, of
obligatory application. Their application is reserved for the case in which
application of foreign law has been pleaded by a party. A presumption of conflict
of laws thus remains absent from Quebec law; conflict avoidance remains possible.
Mexican private international law underwent significant reform in 1988 prior
to Mexican adherence to NAFTA. Most pertinent are amendments to the Federal
Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure for the Federal District
of Mexico, both of which adopt similar texts in relation to the application of foreign
law in Mexico. Article 86 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure provided in the
past that: "Only facts shall be subject to proof: law shall be subject to proof only
when based on foreign law, practices, customs or binding precedents.""
Following the 1988 amendments the reference to foreign law was deleted from
article 86 and a new article 86 bis was added, which provides:
The court shall apply foreign law in the same way as it would be
applied by the judges of the State the law of which is applicable, without
prejudice to the parties being able to plead the existence and content of the
foreign law.2
For information on the text, validity, meaning and scope of foreign law,
the court may make use of official reports, notably those it may solicit
from the Mexican Foreign Service Ministry, as well as preparing and
admitting the proof which it considers necessary or which are offered by
the parties.29
The precise effect of these articles is not clear and Mexican doctrinal authority
appears divided. Professor Pereznieto considers that they require Mexican rules of
private international law to be applied in an obligatory manner by the Mexican
judge; he cites continental models to similar effect and gives examples of how the
Mexican judge can obtain information on the content of foreign law.3" Professor
Arellano insists on the ongoing necessity of proof by lawyers, which would
represent the dominant position on this question in the world.3 Professor Ovalle
concludes that proof of foreign law is no longer the exclusive preserve of the
parties, though they retain the possibility of offering such proof.32 Given the
27. The translation is that of Fernando Alejandro Vazquez Pando in New Trends in Mexican
Private International Law, 23 Int'l Law 995, 1003 (1989).
28. Translation of Vazquez Pando, supra note 27, at 1004. Article 14 of the Federal Civil Code
was also amended in a similar manner in 1988.
29. Author's translation.
30. Leonel Pereznieto Castro, Derecho intemacional privado 277-81 (5th ed. 1991).
31. C. Arellano Garcia, Derecho internacional privado 910-15 (11 th ed. 1995).
32. J. Ovalle Favela, Derecho procesal civil 133 (6th ed. 1994).
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apparent ambiguity of the texts, and the NAFTA context, it would seem appropriate
to limit the amendments to the question of proof of foreign law, opening the
possibility for the court to take judicial notice of foreign law or to request a formal
opinion on its content, without requiring obligatory application of Mexican rules of
private international law in all cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
North American jurisdictions have historically resisted the conclusion that rules
of private international law are of obligatory application by the court. This view
was taken in the nineteenth century by some continental jurisdictions as a means of
ensuring equal respect for foreign law. The consequence of this view is the creation
of a presumption of conflict of laws, such that the choice of law process is
obligatorily imposed on the parties in all cases which have a significant
international element. Such a presumption, it is suggested, is not justifiable in the
cadre of NAFTA in twentieth or twenty-first century North America, in which a
presumption of harmony of laws is more appropriate. Such a presumption of
harmony justifies invocation of private international law rules only when they are
invoked by one or both of the parties to the dispute. Old law is sometimes most
appropriate for new circumstances.
[Vol. 601112
